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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
ing the use of property would be valid since the holding of prop-
erty is subject at all times to a valid exercise of the police
power.0 8
Conclusion
The development of the Louisiana law of building restric-
tions will probably continue to be through further legislative
enactments and adaptation of common law theories and civilian
theories of servitude. Since there seems to be no predominance
of adaptation of the common law or civilian theories, it would
seem that the courts in developing the jurisprudence will con-
tinue to adapt the rules that appear to give the more just
results.
Martin Smith, Jr.
Union Enforcement of Individual Employee Rights
Arising from a Collective Bargaining Contract
It appears to be settled that vis a vis the employer, a col-
lective bargaining contract creates rights for individual em-
ployees, as well as for unions.' The distinction between employee
and union rights may be illustrated by comparing a contract pro-
vision which concerns individual wages of the employees 2 with a
provision which provides for arbitration of grievances.8 This
Comment is concerned with the enforcement by a union of the
individual rights of the employees as against the employer.
Section 301 (a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act
provides that either the union or the employer may sue in the
federal courts for the enforcement of a collective bargaining
contract.4 It has been held, however, that the individual em-
63. Ransome v. Police Jury of Parish of Jefferson, 216 La. 994, 45 So.2d 601
(1950).
1. Howlett, Contract Rights of the Individual Employee as Against the Em-
ployer, 8 LAD. L.J. 316, 319 (1957); Report of Committee on Improvement ofAdministration of Union Management Agreements, 1954, 50 Nw. L. REv. 143,
158 (1955).
2. See Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 348
U.S. 437 (1955).
3. See Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353
U.S. 448 (1957).
4. 61 STAT. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1952) : "Suits for violation of
contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees
in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such
labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States
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ployee may not bring suit in federal court under this section.
Since many of the provisions of a collective bargaining contract
run to the individual employees, the question of whether the
union may enforce these individual rights under Section 301 was
raised. The federal jurisprudence in this area has fallen into
three general categories: (1) suits by a union for the enforce-
ment of an individual right which arises from a collective bar-
gaining contract; (2) suits by a union to compel the employer to
arbitrate individual grievances of the employee, pursuant to the
grievance machinery set out in the collective bargaining con-
tract; and (3) suits by a union for enforcement of an arbitra-
tor's award which runs to the individual employee. These three
categories will be discussed separately, and will be followed by
a discussion of the jurisdiction of state courts and the law ap-
plicable therein.
Suits by a Union for the Enforcement of an Individual Right
Which Arises from a Collective Bargaining Contract
In Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec-
tric Corp.,O the union brought suit under Section 301 on behalf
of some four thousand employees. Each employee claimed dam-
ages in the amount of one day of back pay resulting from the
employer's alleged breach of the collective bargaining contract.
The United States Supreme Court, in a six to two decision, held
that Section 301 did not confer jurisdiction on the federal court
in this type of case. Although there was no majority opinion, the
three concurring opinions agreed that Section 301 and its legis-
lative history did not indicate sufficiently an intention to allow
the union standing to enforce individual rights of the employees.
As expressed by Mr. Chief Justice Warren in his concurring
opinion, these rights are "uniquely personal" to the employees,
and not enforceable by the union in the federal courts.7 Mr.
Justices Douglas and Black dissented on the grounds that since
the union represented the employees in the collective bargaining
process, it should be allowed to enforce any right created thereby
having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy
or without regard to the citizenship of the parties." This section will be referred
to hereafter as Section 301.
5. United Protective Workers of America v. Ford Motor Co., 194 F.2d 997(7th Cir. 1952); Shatte v. Theatrical Stage Employees and Moving Picture
Machine Operators, 182 F.2d 158 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 827
(1950).
6. 348 U.S. 437 (1955).
7. Id. at 461.
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in the federal courts.8 The courts of appeals have applied the
doctrine of this case to bar any suit under Section 301 in which
the union has attempted to enforce uniquely personal rights of
the employees. These have included rights as to health and wel-
fare funds,9 discharge without notice,"' and pensions."
Suits By Unions to Compel Arbitration of Individual
Grievances of Employees
In Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of
Alabama,'2 the union sued for the enforcement of an agreement
to arbitrate grievances. The specific grievances involved were
the work loads and work assignments of several employees, and
would appear to be in the nature of uniquely personal rights.
The Supreme Court, however, enforced the agreement, distin-
guishing the Westinghouse case on the grounds that an agree-
ment to arbitrate involves the union as an entity, whereas the
collection of back pay is an individual right of the employee. 8
Thus, the federal courts do have jurisdiction under Section 301
of a suit by a union to compel the employer to arbitrate griev-
ances of the individual employee.
Suits by a Union To Enforce an Arbitrator's Award Which
Runs to the Individual Employees
After the Lincoln Mills case there was speculation as to
whether Lincoln Mills or Westinghouse would control cases in
which a union sued, under Section 301, for enforcement of an
arbitrator's award which ran to the individual employees. There
was a division of authority among the courts of appeals on this
matter, with two circuits enforcing the award on the basis of
Lincoln Mills,1 4 and one denying jurisdiction of the suit on the
8. Id. at 464.
9. International Garment Workers Union v. Jay Ann Co., 228 F.2d 632 (5th
Cir. 1956).
10. United Electrical Radio and Machine Workers v. General Electric Co., 231
F.2d 259 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 872 (1956).
11. United Steelworkers of America v. Pullman Standard Car Manufacturing
Co., 241 F.2d 547 (3d Cir. 1957).
12. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
13. Id. at 456, n. 6
14. Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Union v. Delta Refining Co., 277 F.2d
694 (6th Cir. 1960) ; Textile Workers Union of America v. American Thread Co.,
271 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1959); Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp. v. United Steel-
workers of America, 269 F.2d 327 (4th Cir. 1959) (award not enforced on other
grounds) ; Textile Workers Union of America v. Cone Mills, 268 F.2d 920 (4th
Cir. 1959) ; Kornman Co. v. Clothing Workers, 264 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1959).
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basis of Westinghouse.1 In Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp. v.
United Steelworkers, 6 an arbitrator had reinstated eleven dis-
charged employees with back pay. Upon the employer's refusal
to comply with the award, the union moved for its enforcement
under Section 301. The district court directed the employer to
comply, but this judgment was modified by the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals. 17 On certiorari, the Supreme Court reinstated
the award in its entirety, finding that the court of appeals had
exceeded its jurisdiction in modifying the award."' The possible
application of the Westinghouse case was not mentioned, al-
though the employer had contended in the lower courts that this
case should control and deny jurisdiction of the suit. Thus, on
the basis of the Enterprise case, a union apparently may sue in
the federal courts under Section 301 for the enforcement of an
arbitrator's award which runs to the individual employees.
State Court Jurisdiction and Applicable Law
The holdings of Lincoln Mills and Enterprise indicate that
the federal courts will enforce an agreement to arbitrate indi-
vidual grievances as well as the corresponding award under
Section 301. The question remains as to whether the union may
bring such suits in state courts, and if so, whether the state
courts should apply federal or state law.
As stated by Mr. Justice Bradley in Claffin v. Houseman,9
"[I]f exclusive jurisdiction [in the federal courts] be neither
express nor implied, the State courts have concurrent jurisdic-
tion [to enforce federal rights] whenever, by their own consti-
tution, they are competent to take it." Section 301 does not ex-
pressly withdraw state court jurisdiction, and its legislative his-
tory does not imply that such was the intent of Congress. 20 This
suggests that state jurisdiction was to be supplemented rather
than superseded by the statute.21 In line with this reasoning,
several state courts have exercised jurisdiction over suits which
15. Mississippi Valley Electric Co. v. Local 130 of the International Brother-
hood of Electrical Workers, 278 F.2d 764 (5th Cir. 1960).
16. 168 F.Supp. 308 (S.D. W. Va. 1958).
17. 269 F.2d 327 (4th Cir. 1959).
18. 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (U.S. 1960).
19. 93 U.S. 130, 136 (1876).
20. In this connection see Wollett & Wellington, Federalism and Breach of the
Labor Agreement, 7 STAN. L. REV. 445, 454 (1955).
21. See Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress and State Jurisdiction over
Labor Relations, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 269, 277 (1959).
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apparently could have been brought in the federal court under
Section 301.22
The question of whether the state court should apply federal
or state law in these cases is also raised. In Lincoln Mills, the
Court said that in Section 301 cases federal interpretation of fed-
eral law governs and that this body of law was to be fashioned
by the courts from the national labor laws.2 3 Therefore, in
actions brought in state courts to enforce the federal right
granted under Section 301, it would appear that federal sub-
stantive law should be applied. The several state courts which
have exercised jurisdiction in the Lincoln Mills and Enterprise
type cases have applied law which is compatible with federal
law. As stated by Justice Traynor of the California court, "It is
obvious that in exercising this jurisdiction state courts are no
longer free to apply state law, but must apply the federal law
of collective bargaining agreements. ' '25 Therefore, it would ap-
pear that federal law will be applied in both the federal and state
forums, and that both an agreement to arbitrate and an arbitra-
tion award will be enforceable.
The Westinghouse case held that the union has no standing
under Section 301 to enforce individual rights of employees con-
cerning back pay. The courts of appeals have applied this doc-
trine to bar these suits whenever the rights involved are consid-
ered to be uniquely personal.2 6 Consequently, union rights which
arise from a collective bargaining contract may be enforced in
either the federal or state court, but uniquely personal rights
which arise from the same contract may be enforced only in the
state court.27
22. McCarroll v. Los Angeles County District Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal.2d
45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958); Coleman Co. v.
International Union, United Auto Workers, 181 Kan. 969, 317 P.2d 831 (1957) ;
Steinberg v. Mendel Rosenweig Fine Furs Inc., 9 Misc.2d 611, 167 N.Y.S.2d 865
(Sup. Ct. 1957) ; Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International Union v. Lone
Star Producing Co., 332 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
Several actions which have been instigated in state court have been removed
by the defendant to the federal court. E.g., Minkoff v. Scranton Frocks, Inc., 181
F. Supp. 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) ; Swift & Co. v. United Packinghouse Workers, 177
F. Supp. 511 (D. Colo. 1959).
23. Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S.
448, 456 (1957).
24. See note 22 8upra.
25. McCarroll v. Los Angeles County District Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal.2d
45, 315 P.2d 322, 330 (1957).
26. See notes 9, 10, and 11 supra.
27. This could be done by the union, if it has a standing under the state law,
,or by the individual employee. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated in the Weating-
house case: "The employees have always been able to enforce their rights in the
[Vol. XXI
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As to the question of which substantive law should be applied
in this area by the state court, this situation differs from that
of Lincoln Mills and Enterprise in that here the federal courts
would not have concurrent jurisdiction. The Lincoln Mills case
held that the federal courts were to fashion a body of federal
law to apply in Section 301 cases involving collective bargaining
contracts.28 It could be argued that this body of federal law
should preempt any state law which is incompatible with it, and
that federal law should govern all areas in collective bargaining
contracts.29 This would mean that the state courts should apply
federal law in enforcing uniquely personal rights, even though
the Westinghouse case would preclude enforcement of these
rights in the federal courts. Such an interpretation would have
the virtue of placing all rights which arise from a collective bar-
gaining contract under one body of substantive law. On the
other hand, it could be argued that Section 301, as interpreted
in Westinghouse, does not grant a federal right to enforce
uniquely personal rights of employees. Therefore, there is no
basis for supposing that any existing state causes of action are
preempted, and the Westinghouse type case would be governed
by state law in the state court.80 The result of this interpreta-
tion would be that union rights would be governed by federal
law, but uniquely personal rights which arise from the same
contract would be governed by state law. In the few cases which
have been decided in this area the issue has not been presented,
probably because there was no obvious conflict between the state
and federal law.31
The rationale of the Court in Westinghouse and, more espe-
cially, the utility of the decision today, have been questioned by
several writers.32 Common sense would seem to dictate that all
rights which arise from any contract should be enforceable in
state courts." Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,
348 U.S. 437, 460 (1955).
28. Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S.
448, 456 (1957).
29. Where state law is in conflict with federal law, the state law must yield.
Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179 (1954).
30. For an extensive discussion of this area, see Wollett & Wellington, Federal-
ism and Breach of the Labor Agreement, 7 STAN. L. REV. 445, 464 (1955).
31. Bridges v. F. H. McGraw & Co., 302 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. App. 1957) (court
treated state substantive law as controlling although the issue was not contested) ;
Karcz v. Luther Manufacturing Co., 155 N.E.2d 441 (Mass. 1959) ; Springer v.
Powder Power Tool Corp., 348 P.2d 1112 (Ore. 1960).
32. See Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdiction over
Labor Relations, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 269 (1959) ; Isaacson, The Implications of




the same forums and under the same substantive law. The West-
inghouse case prevents that and in this respect is in conflict with
the national policy of uniformity in the regulation of labor rela-
tions. It has been suggested that this case will be overruled if
the issue is presented again.3 3 This position would seem to be
supported somewhat by the result in the Enterprise case; for it
would seem that the union's interest would be satisfied if the
employer is compelled to arbitrate and that the enforcement of
the award would fall more nearly into the category of uniquely
personal rights. Consequently, the Court's allowing the union to
enforce the arbitrator's award would seem to suggest that a
retreat from Westinghouse is occurring, although there was no
discussion of this in the Enterprise case and although the West-
inghouse case was not overruled.
It is submitted that the most expeditious remedy would be a
legislative overruling of Westinghouse by amending Section 301
so that any right which arises from a collective bargaining con-
tract may be enforced in the federal courts. Such a course would
eliminate the anomaly that exists today because of the Westing-
house decision and would result in all rights in a collective bar-
gaining contract being governed by the same substantive law.
Peyton Moore
Recovery of Stolen Paper Money Under the
Louisiana Civil Code and the Negotiable
Instruments Law
Article 21381 of the Louisiana Civil Code provides that if a
debtor give a thing in payment of his obligation, which he has
no right to deliver, his obligation is not discharged and the
owner may recover his goods, unless the obligation has been
discharged by the payment of money or things which are con-
sumed in use, and the creditor has used them; in which case
33. Isaacson, The Implication8 of the Recent Supreme Court Decisions on
Labor Arbitration, 13 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 67 (1958).
1. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2138 (1870) : "If the debtor give a thing in payment
of his obligation, which he has no right to deliver, it does not discharge his obliga-
tion, and the owner of the thing given may reclaim it in the hands of the creditor,
unless the obligation has been discharged by the payment of money, or the delivery
of some of those things which are consumed in the use, and the creditor has used
them; in which cases neither the money nor the things consumed can be reclaimed,
and the payment will be good."
[Vol. XXI
